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I Introduction
Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) consider a trade model under uncertainty in crops production
to show there is a possibility of Pareto inferior trade under free trade. In their model, there
are risky and non-risky crops, and farmers allocate their resources to the two crops. The
nominal income of consumer is given as a parameter, as it is a partial equilibrium model. In
our model, we use a similar model to verify their results under a general equilibrium
framework to see if the Pareto inferior result still holds for a general equilibrium model.
This study is an extension of Newbery and Stiglitz (op. cit.). Hallstrom (2004) extends the
same model in a dierent way by including weather forecasting; hence, his model is
intrinsically a dynamic model. In our model, the model is extended to be a static general
equilibrium model.
For the base model, we use a Ricardian model of international trade under uncertainty. In
our model, there are two regions with two sectors called agriculture and manufacturing.
Since we focus on a symmetric model, we assume that production technologies of
agricultural and manufacturing goods in the two regions are identical, and the two regions
are the same size in terms of population. The agricultural sector is aected by weather
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conditions in the respective regions. The weather is either good or bad. For further
symmetry, weather conditions of the two regions are perfectly negatively correlated at 50%
probability. Turnovsky (1974) provides various versions of Ricardian model under
uncertainty. Our model is another version of his model: uncertainty only in one production
sector.
The discussions are developed as follows. We set up the basic framework and derive the
equilibrium conditions both for autarky and interregional trade in Section II (technical
proofs for remarks provided in this section are provided in the appendix). The model is then
numerically examined in Section III. For the simulation, parameters are determined to be
symmetric. Further inferences and concluding comments are given in Section IV.
II The Model
We consider a model of two regions on an island, the East (E) and theWest (W). E and W
are divided by high mountains, which make trade between E and W costly. Both regions are
capable of two products, agricultural (A) and manufacturing (M) goods. E and W are
assumed to produce identical agricultural and manufacturing goods using identical
technologies. Goods can be traded, but trading between the regions is costly.
The dierence between the regions is weather. If E has a wet year, W has a dry year
(drought). Conversely, if W has a wet year, E has a dry year. The harvest of the agricultural
good is conditional on the weather: wet is good while dry is bad for A. The production of
M is not aected by the weather. The timeline of this model is as shown in Figure 1. In the
beginning (t = 0), producers and consumers make predictions about the future weather to
generate expected prices as a basis for allocating their resources. After the allocations,
producers start production. Before production is completed, weather occurs in each region
(t = 1). After that, actual income is generated and actual consumption takes place (t = 2).
We call the phase before completion of production ex ante and after completion of
production ex post.
M is produced by labor and A is produced by labor and weather conditions. The
production functions of A and M are represented by classical technologies A = Ω × αAL and
M =αML, where L and Ω are labor input and weather conditions, respectively, and αA and αM
are the marginal products of labor for the respective goods ( input coecients are thus
βA αA−1 and βM αM−1).1
Let pij be the price of i {A,M}in region j {E,W}. Similarly, let wij be the corresponding
wage rate. The profit maximization and utility maximization problems of each region are
1 Turnovsky (1974) assumes technologies of both sectors include stochastic factors while ours incudes
them only in one sector.
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then given by
(1)
The resource constraint of region j is
(2)
The first order conditions for the two problems are
(3)
Consumers in the two regions have identical tastes represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function:
(4)
where aij and mij are the quantities of consumption of agricultural and manufacturing goods
for a consumer in region j working for sector i, respectively, and ρ is the preference
parameter (expenditure share of A).
The ex post utility maximization problem of the consumer is given by
(5)
where Rij = wij is realized income. The first order conditions of this consumer’s problem
provide
(6)
where each real income level wij / pij , given by (3), is
(7)
where πj pAj / pMj represents the relative price of A vis-á-vis M.
To obtain labor allocations, we have to obtain an ex post equilibrium since workers look
at expected utility levels (income and relative price) to choose the sector to join. We apply
Figure 1. Timeline of the model
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Walras Law to compute the equilibrium values. The ex post market clearing condition for
interregional trade equilibrium is given by
(8)
whereij Lij / Lj represents the share of labor in sector i in region j; hence,Aj +Mj 1.
By symmetry, the population of the two regions is assumed to be the same: LW LE. We
then postulate the following remarks to solve the resource allocations ex ante.
Remark 1 Our model is symmetric. In addition, weather conditions in the two regions are
perfectly negatively correlated. In interregional trade equilibrium, the ex ante market
clearing condition coincides with the ex post market clearing condition.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Remark 2 In our model, the market clearing conditions for the interregional and the ex
ante autarky equilibria coincide with each other.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Now we suppose W has good weather, so that
(9)
In this case, the relative price of A in W becomes lower than that in E if there is no trade.
If the two regions trade their goods, W’s A flow into E in exchange for M from E. Let T be
a common transaction cost per unit of A and M between W and E; hence, the prices in
the cost-aected ex post equilibrium are
(10)
where pij is the corresponding price in autarky, and the relative price is then
(11)
Let us further define τ T / pMW to get
(12)
where 0 < τ < τ < 1 for a prohibitive transaction cost τ, as pMW > T by pME > 0 and ΩW > ΩE.
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We note that W imports A from E in exchange for exporting M if W has bad weather
(e.g., ΩW < ΩE). Thus, by symmetry, the relative prices and the transportation cost are
related as
(13)
where τ t / pME. Since the positions of East and West in (12) are interchanged in (13)
i.e., the importer of A for the former case is now the exporter of A and vice versa for M
we can easily find τΩW>ΩE τΩW<ΩE.
Remark 3 There is interregional trade when West has good weather so long as πW < πW + τ < πE.
Analogously, there is interregional trade when East has good weather so long as πE < πE + τ< πW.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Currently, there are two conditions, (8) and (12) (for ΩW > ΩE), and four unknowns, πj
andAj for j = {E,W}, to solve the equilibrium when there is interregional trade. Thus, we
have to provide two additional equilibrium conditions to solve the model. The one comes
from symmetry. For instance, labor allocations must be identical across two regions in the
equilibrium:
(14)
The other comes from the labor market clearing condition for risk-averse consumers:
(15)
where aij* and mij* are optimum consumption levels of agricultural and manufacturing goods
of workers of sector i in region j, as given by (6). In general, we have labor market clearing
conditions in the two regions. However, in the symmetric model, the two conditions become
identical; hence, only one equation results from (15). Eventually, we find four conditions for
four unknowns to solve interregional trade equilibrium. In autarky, there are two conditions,
analogue of (8) and (15), and two unknowns, πj andAj for each region. Thus, the autarky
equilibrium is now also solved.
It is worthwhile clarifying attitudes to risk in our model and other related studies before
we go on to numerical investigations. In (15), we are intrinsically looking at risk-averse
agents. In our model, farmers and manufacturing workers are consumers, as in general
equilibrium. In Newbery and Stiglitz (1984), farmers and consumers are separately defined,
in a partial equilibrium. Farmers look only at their income level, which corresponds to (7)
in our model. Since consumers are intrinsically risk-averse, their payos are represented by
Revisiting Pareto Inferior Trade with a Stochastic Ricardian Model
and Transaction Cost: A Preliminary Investigation under Symmetry 33
Table 1. Parameters for the simulation
Expenditure share of A 0.5
Input coecient of A 1
Input coecient of M 1
Probability of good weather 0.5
Coecient of bad weather 0.5
Coecient of good weather 1.5
a concave utility function (i.e., risk-averse CRRA utility function). Therefore, Newbery and
Stiglitz consider risk-neutral farmers and risk-averse consumers. Hallstrom (2004) focuses
only on risk-neutral farmers to study the value of forecasting.
III Numerical Simulations
A Parameters
We compute the model with parameter values shown in Table 1. These parameters are
chosen to create symmetry in production and consumption. In particular, the expenditure
share of the agricultural good (ρ=0.5) is equal to the expenditure share of the manufacturing
good (1− ρ= 0.5); and the input coecient of the agricultural good (βA αA−1 1) is equal
to the input coecient of the manufacturing good (βM αM−1 1) . In addition, the probability
of good weather in West (and the probability of bad weather in East) is given by 50% and
the coecients of good weather and bad weather are given by 0.5 (−50% from the expected
value) and 1.5 (+50% from the expected value), respectively. In this case, the expected value
of marginal product of A is αA 1 and then the marginal products of A and M become
symmetric when labor allocations are determined.
B Autarky
“Autarky” in our model means that there is no inter-regional trade. Later on when we
consider interregional trade, it provides the prohibitive transaction cost τ and values in the
autarky equilibrium (e.g., prices, welfare levels, and so on) when τ > τ . To compute the
autarky equilibrium, we apply Remark 2 to obtain the labor allocationA* before weather
conditions occur. We then useA* to compute the autarky ex post equilibrium prices under
good and bad weather conditions, which provide welfare levels of workers in each sector
under each weather condition. The result is reported in Table 2.
From this result, we can confirm that the labor shares of agricultural and manufacturing
sectors are 50% each since the two sectors are indierent in expected income levels in
autarky. In addition, it is noteworthy that the welfare levels of the two sectors are identical
under respective weather conditions. This result confirms that our model leads to an
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Table 2. Key values in the autarky equilibrium
Relative price in bad weather 0.6667
Relative price in good weather 2.0000
Population of farmers (sector A workers) 0.5000
Welfare of sector A worker in bad weather 0.3536
Welfare of sector A worker in good weather 0.6124
Welfare of sector M worker in bad weather 0.3536
Welfare of sector M worker in good weather 0.6124
analogous result to that shown by Newbery and Stiglitz (1984): risks are covered by price
adjustments when there is no interregional trade.
C Interregional Trade
We know that the ex ante and ex post market clearing conditions coincide with each other
(Remark 1). To obtain equilibrium values, we initially solve (8) and (15) for each i and j
withAE* AW* A* (τ) for τ  [0,1]. We then compare the obtained ex post relative price
with the ex post relative price in the autarky equilibrium to determine the prohibitive
transaction cost τ (cf., Remark 3).
Comparing the autarky and interregional trade equilibrium prices, the prohibitive
transaction cost is computed as τ 0.4006; hence, the autarky equilibrium is realized for
τ > τ . The relative prices in East and West for each transaction cost, πE (τ) and πW (τ), are
shown in Figure 2 (left) andA* (τ) 1 −M* (τ) in Figure 2 (right). According to this
result, the realized relative price decreases with transaction cost in the bad weather region
while it increases in the good weather region. Here, we can confirm that the relative price of
the two regions coincide with each other when there is no transaction cost (i.e., free trade).
In addition, we can also see that the population of farmers falls when trade becomes open
and continues declining until it reaches a certain transaction cost τ* 0.2433. It starts rising
as transaction cost declines further than τ*. When there is no transaction cost, the population
of farmers reverts to the autarky level.
Movements of relative prices are quite natural in trade theory and those under free trade
are consistent with Newbery and Stiglitz’s result. To understand the movement ofA*, one
needs to see the movement of the wage rate of farmers ωA as shown in Figure 3, where the
right chart represents first order derivatives of the curves in the left chart. In this figure, the
population of farmers is normalized to be unity under autarky. Without loss of generality,
assuming that region k has good weather, ωA E[wAj / pMk] is defined to be the real wage
rate vis-á-vis M, as M in the good weather region is considered as de facto numéraire in
this model. This figure shows that population of farmers is positively correlated with the
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expected income (wage) level of farmers for the most part. However, the critical point of
population and expected wage of farmers do not coincide with each other. This result stems
from the condition for labor allocations (15) that equates expected utility levels. By such a
specification, we are looking at risk-averse agents. There are risks in production of A that
aect the wage level of farmers. The dierence in the critical points is thus explained by
the risk-averse preference: as Figure 3 (right) shows, an increase in ωA does not immediately
induce an increase in A* until ωA reaches a sucient level to compensate for the risks in
production.
From πj (τ) andA* (τ), the realized welfare levels of the respective sectors in the two
regions are computed as shown in Figure 4. As shown, the welfare level of sector A
increases with τ in good weather while it decreases with τ in bad weather. This implies that
the risk in the agricultural sector increases as transaction cost declines. In contrast, the
welfare level of sector M decreases with τ in good weather while it increases with τ in bad
weather to reduce the risk from fluctuations of commodity prices, and finally the risk of
sector M workers is eliminated under free trade. In order to see the further relationship
betweenA* and welfare levels, we consider the expected welfare level.
Table 3 shows welfare levels in good and bad weather conditions and expected welfare
levels for some τ . As this table shows, the expected welfare levels of the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors are equal to each other. This result is consistent with the labor market
clearing condition given by equating expected utility levels, as in (15). The expected welfare
level for all τ is depicted in Figure 5. From Figure 4, we have learned that the risk of
workers in the agricultural sector increases as τ declines. An increase in the risk is thus
compensated by an increase in the expected welfare when the population of farmers
increases. When the population of farmers goes down, the compensation is insucient.
It should be noted that Pareto inferior trade as shown in Newbery and Stiglitz (1984)
cannot be confirmed if we focus on the expected welfare level (e.g., the average social
welfare level in the long run). However, if we focus separately on the welfare level and the
income level, we do find a similar result to Newbery and Stiglitz. Under interregional trade,
consumers are unambiguously better-o in their result and expected welfare is
unambiguously improved in our model. By interregional trade, risky crop planters are
unambiguously worse-o in their result and the expected income level decreases with τ if
compensations are insucient between the critical value and τ in our model, as depicted in
Figure 3.2 In other words, it is due to the critical dierence of our general equilibrium
framework from the partial equilibrium framework of Newbery and Stiglitz that free trade
2 If we consider Pareto inferiority in comparison with autarky, we can say that Pareto inferior trade is
observed if there is transaction cost (cf., free trade and autarky are indierent).
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Figure 2. Regional prices and population of farmers for each transportation cost
Figure 3. Expected wage and population of farmers
Figure 4. Welfare levels
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unambiguously improves “payos” in our model while free trade may lead to Pareto
inferior trade in Newbery and Stiglitz’s. In addition, to study a possibility of Pareto inferior
trade in a general equilibrium framework, the existence of transaction cost will be one of
the key factors in theoretical modeling.
IV Inferences and Conclusions
We have studied an extension of Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) under symmetry. In our
general equilibrium framework, by focusing on the income of farmers, Pareto inferior trade
is observed when transaction cost is postulated; otherwise, we cannot observe Pareto inferior
trade. Based on the expected welfare level, Pareto inferior trade is not observed. However,
Newbery and Stiglitz also suggest that consumers are made unambiguously better o by
trade. Thus, to some extent, our result does not contradicts to theirs.
In addition to Pareto inferiority, we could discuss transfer of risk as transaction cost
declines. The risky sector (agriculture) experiences an increase in price variation while the
Table 3. Welfare levels
Agriculture Manufacturing
Weather Good Bad Expected Good Bad Expected
τ > τ
τ = 0.4
τ = 0.3
τ = 0.2
τ = 0.1
τ = 0
0.6124
0.6278
0.6608
0.6918
0.7214
0.7500
0.3536
0.3386
0.3100
0.2865
0.2668
0.2500
0.4830
0.4832
0.4854
0.4892
0.4941
0.5000
0.6124
0.5973
0.5675
0.5421
0.5198
0.5000
0.3536
0.3691
0.4032
0.4363
0.4685
0.5000
0.4830
0.4832
0.4854
0.4892
0.4941
0.5000
Figure 5. Expected welfare
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non-risky sector (manufacturing) experiences a decrease in price variation. The risk in the
non-risky sector ultimately vanishes under free trade. Accuracy of forecasting can be
considered as a reduction of transaction cost. In this sense, Hallstrom’s (2004) and our
result are comparable. In Hallstrom (op. cit.), an increase in the accuracy of forecasting
increases price variations, as our result also suggests. In his model, the income level
unambiguously improves. However, our model suggests the expected income level of
farmers shows an inverse hump-shaped curve and this in turn produces an inverse hump-
shaped curve for the population of farmers.
Trade and environmental issues are possible further applications of this model. Decades
have passed since environmental problems were first recognized as an important concern,
but the problems have not yet been resolved, and indeed are getting more serious.
Environmental changes aect trade patterns, since they aect agriculture sectors (i.e., Tol,
2009, and Moon, 2011). For instance, international and interregional trades are aected by
agricultural protectionism, agricultural sustainability, food insecurity in the least developed
countries, climate change, greenhouse gas emissions, and so on: for example, global
environmental change on agricultural products is explored by Reilly and Hohmann (1993),
while the importance of forecasting under uncertain weather is studied by Hallstrom (op.
cit.). Furthermore, transaction cost is improved by improvements in fuel economy
(technological progress, decline in fuel prices, etc.). If a country imports resources, it can
reduce energy costs by developing low-cost energy resources, subsidizing cost-cutting
technologies, exchange rate policies, and so on. The directions of such extensions are also
shown in Nordhaus and Yang (1996). In their study, strategies against climate change in di
erent countries are discussed.
Appendix 1 Proof of Remark 1
Let ΩG and ΩB < ΩG be coecients of good and bad weather conditions, respectively. Let γj
be probability of good weather in region j. The expected aggregate production of A is
(16)
where γW 1 − γE as weather is perfectly negatively correlated. Let γW = γ to rewrite the
above equation to get
(17)
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In the symmetric equilibrium,AE =AW is held,3 so that the second term of (17) vanishes
and it becomes
(18)
wherei*ij is the equilibrium labor allocations to sector i. We can then easily find that
(18) is the same as the ex post value of production of the agricultural good.
Next, we consider the expected value of aggregate demand:
(19)
where πkj is the relative regional price in region j when region k has a good weather. By
symmetry, we then find πEE πWW and πWE  πEW. Let π jj = π and πkj = πfor j k to arrange
(19) as
(20)
This equation is the same as the ex post aggregate demand, as the first term is the demand
for the agricultural good in the good weather region and the second term is that in the bad
weather region. Therefore, the ex ante market clearing condition assumes the same form as
the ex post market clearing condition:
(21)
Appendix 2 Proof of Remark 2
The expected supply of A in region j is computed as
(22)
3 It must also have γE γW 0.5.
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Since the model is symmetric, we apply γj 0.5 to get the expected production for the
autarky equilibrium:
(23)
The expected demand is computed as
(24)
Similarly, we apply γj 0.5 to get
(25)
From (23) and (25), the market clearing condition for the ex ante autarky equilibrium is
given by
(26)
We then easily find that 1=2 in both sides of the market clearing condition for the ex ante
autarky equilibrium (26) cancels out to leave this condition identical to that for the
interregional trade equilibrium (21).
Appendix 3 Proof of Remark 3
We consider the case in which West has a good weather. From (10), we find
(27)
which implies
(28)
Therefore, the condition for interregional trade is written as πW < πW + τ < πE (by symmetry,
the condition for interregional trade is πE < πE + τ< πW if East has good weather).
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